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Managerial attributes and Equity mutual fund performance: 
Evidence from China 
 
Emmanuel Mamatzkisa and Bingrun Xub 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper examines the performance of Chinese equity mutual funds and 
investigates the impact of fund managerial attributes (tenure, team management 
structure, management educational factors and funds under management) on equity 
mutual fund performance during the sample period from 2005 to 2013. The equity 
fund performance is measured using the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) and 
several traditional fund performance methods such as Jensen’s Alpha and the Sharp 
ratio. The paper reveals that team–management in a large fund size has a negative 
impact on fund performance. A fund managed by managers with a longer tenure will 
perform worse than a fund whose managers are relatively new to a fund. 
Furthermore, there is a negative relationship between funds under management and 
equity fund performance. This paper finds that only fund managers with Master’s 
degrees have a positive impact on fund performance in the Chinese equity mutual 
fund industry.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The mutual fund market in China has experienced explosive growth since the first 
mutual fund – the Hua An Chuang Xin - was established in China in September 2001. 
According to statistics from the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), 
the total amount of investment in funds has increased from 218 funds with a total net 
value of 469 billion Chinese Yuan in 2005, to 1814 funds at the end of 2014 with a 
net asset value of 4.4 trillion Chinese Yuan. By the end of 2014, the total number of 
equity funds had increased to 684, while the number of bond funds, money market 
funds, hybrid funds, and qualified domestic institutional investors (QDII)c stood at 
452, 156, 379 and 87 respectively. The enormous increase in the number of mutual 
funds during this period has led to mutual funds becoming the most important 
institutional investments in China’s financial market, as they promote the value of the 
concept of investment to the public and optimize the investment structure in the 
Chinese stock market (Zhao and Wang, 2007).  
Given that there are so many mutual funds available in a market, a fund manager 
may find it difficult to obtain superior earnings because numerous competitors with 
professional investment skills are operating in the same market. Interestingly, Tang 
et al (2012) claim that the average values of alpha in the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM), Fama–French three-factor model and the Benchmark–adjusted returns are 
all positive across all Chinese equity mutual funds during the period from 2004 to 
2010. Their findings reveal that Chinese mutual funds have been performing better 
than the market on average. However, on average, most studies in the U.S. and UK 
find little or no evidence for a superior performance among mutual funds and some 
studies even report stronger evidence of underperformance (Wermers, 2000; Baks 
et al, 2001; Thomas and Tonks, 2001; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2002; Cuthberson et 
al, 2008; Fama and French, 2010; Cuthberson et al, 2012 and Busse et al, 2014). 
 
However, there are several limitations to the traditional fund performance 
measurements referred to above. For instance, they only consider return and risk, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
c	  QDII:	   An	   institutional	   investor	   invests	   in	   securities	   outside	   its	   home	   country.	   QDII	   helps	   to	   promote	   the	  
development	  of	  the	  Chinese	  mutual	  fund	  industry	  as	  it	  encourages	  domestic	  investors	  to	  access	  international	  
financial	  markets.	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and not the fund’s transaction costs (the expenses associated with the purchase and 
sales of assets). In addition, the issue of proper benchmarking has to be taken into 
account, as the performance measurement largely depends on the benchmark 
selection. In recent years, there has been a growing body of studies that have 
employed frontier analysis to overcome the aforementioned obstacles. This paper 
applies the parametric approach to frontier analysis (Stochastic Frontier Approach) in 
order to measure mutual fund performance, following the method used by Babalos et 
al (2014). Among the previous literature, there are few studies which have adopted 
the SFA to measure fund performance. Annaert et al (2003) find that fund efficiency 
is positively related to fund size and historical performance. Santos et al (2005) 
evaluate the performance of 307 Brazilian stock mutual funds by employing 
stochastic frontiers. They indicate a positive relationship between the efficiency 
score and management skills to beat the market. In addition, Babalos et al (2014) 
investigate the performance of US no–loads equity mutual funds using the 
Stochastic Frontier Approach, and suggest that the efficiency score is positively 
related to a shock in risk. Research examining the performance of Chinese mutual 
funds from an efficiency score perspective is particularly scarce. Therefore, the 
research question for this study can be formulated as follows: What is the mutual 
fund’s efficiency score over time in the Chinese fund market? 
Furthermore, despite the existence of mutual funds with superior performance in 
China during recent years, the exact reasons why Chinese mutual funds have 
performed so well have not been fully investigated and are therefore worthy of 
further research. According to academic studies on developed markets, researchers 
recognize the importance of managerial attributes in explaining superior performance, 
as superior performance is related to investment management talent. Golec (1996) 
and Chevalier and Ellison (1999) investigate managerial attributes such as the 
tenure, education and age of fund managers. Their results, as well as those of 
Prather et al (2004) and Bar et al (2011), imply that managerial attributes have a 
significant effect on fund performance, as excellent fund performance is produced by 
superior investment decisions. Several studies conducted in emerging economies 
support this finding (Prather et al, 2001; Zeng et al, 2006; Liu, 2009 and Liu et al, 
2014). Therefore, a second research question can be formulated as follows: do 
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managerial attributes still have a significant impact on fund performance if different 
fund performance evaluation methods are used? 
This paper differs from previous empirical studies on fund performance in the 
following ways. Firstly, unlike the traditional mutual fund performance literature, 
which focuses on the intercept of a regression model, this study examines fund 
performance using the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). Few studies in the 
previous literature have examined and measured mutual fund performance in 
developed countries from the perspective of frontier analysis. Research examining 
Chinese mutual fund performance from the frontier analysis perspective is 
particularly scarce. This paper will therefore contribute to filling this void and will 
benefit investors by enabling them to recognize and understand mutual fund 
performance from a different aspect. 
Secondly, this study also derives a list of fund managerial attributes that have been 
linked with traditional mutual fund performance (Golec, 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 
1999; Prather et al, 2004; Bar et al, 2011; Hu et al, 2012 and Liu et al, 2014). The 
links between managerial attributes and fund efficiency scores have not been 
investigated in the existing literature on Chinese mutual fund research. Few studies 
have been conducted in developed countries. Therefore, the findings of this study 
will complement those of other studies on traditional mutual fund performance in the 
literature. In addition, in view of the concern about endogeneity, this study further 
examines the underlying dynamic relationship between mutual fund performance 
and fund managerial attributes.  
Thirdly, given that China is the world’s largest emerging economy, China’s rapidly 
growing mutual fund industry and securities market have become increasingly 
integrated with the global economy due to a high level of foreign direct investment 
and the increasing number of Chinese firms looking to secure listing status overseas. 
The Chinese financial market offers excellent diversification and investment 
opportunities for international investors. Hence, it is important for foreign investors to 
understand the differences in mutual fund performance, and the characteristics of 
fund managers and the fund market in this emerging economy. The results of this 
paper will help to understand the effect of managerial attributes on fund performance 
5	  
	  
and will also provide an insight into how investors should select the right fund 
managers to manage their wealth. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 derives a list of managerial 
attributes from the literature, as well as explaining how the hypotheses were 
developed. Chapter 3 describes the methodology and data employed. Chapter 4 
presents the results of the empirical study and offers further discussion. Finally, 
Chapter 5 summarizes key findings and suggests policy implications.  
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Chapter Two: Literature review and development of Hypotheses 
 
The role of managerial attributes in improving fund performance has been 
recognized and extensively documented in the literature (Golec, 1996; Chevalier and 
Ellison, 1999; e.g). Motivated by the increasingly important role played by 
managerial attributes, recent studies have focused on two aspects of managerial 
attributes, namely: the characteristics of fund managers (including education, tenure 
and the number of funds under management); and management structure. Firstly, 
the length of tenure is an important indicator of a fund manager’s investment abilities. 
According to the human capital theory, humans tend to learn that the longer they 
have been carrying out an activity for, the better their performance will become. 
Golec (1996) concludes that a better risk-adjusted performance can be expected 
from a fund manager who is relatively young (under the age of 46) and who has a 
longer tenure (normally more than seven years) during the period between 1988 and 
1990 in the U.S market. Prather et al (2004) achieved a similar result by employing a 
comprehensive method to examine the influence of fund–specific characteristics on 
mutual fund performance. However, the coefficient estimate for tenure was not 
statistically significant in this case. Zeng et al (2006) claim that fund managers’ 
tenure is negatively significantly correlated to the performance of mutual funds 
during the period from 2001 to 2004 in the Chinese fund market. This finding is 
supported by Hu et al (2012). Therefore, it is possible to predict that managerial 
tenure has an impact on fund performance. 
 
Hypothesis 1: fund managers’ length of tenure has an impact on fund performance 
 
With respect to the variables associated with funds under management, it is useful to 
measure the number of funds run by a sole manager or a team. Prather et al (2004) 
find that if several funds are managed by the same person or team, this has a 
negative and significant impact on fund performance. Hence, management becomes 
less effective as the number of funds under a manager increases. This finding is 
supported by Hu and Chang (2008), who indicate that the number of funds under 
management has a significantly negative effect on fund performance in the 
Taiwanese fund industry. Hence, the possible relationship between funds under 
management and fund performance is a negative correlation.  
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Hypothesis 2: there is a negative relationship between funds under management and 
fund performance. 
 
Regarding the impact of variables relating to education, it is a logical assumption that 
fund managers with a high level of education also have better professional skills and 
knowledge. Golec (1996) examines the relationship between fund managers with an 
MBA and fund performance. Although he finds that fund managers with MBAs 
perform better than fund managers without MBAs, his results are influenced by the 
survivorship bias. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) investigate the relationship between 
mutual fund performance and characteristics of fund managers, including a 
manager’s age, average student SAT score and whether he/she has an MBA degree. 
They find that performance is positively correlated with the mean composite SAT 
scores of the institutions where managers obtained their undergraduate degree. This 
result is supported by Li et al (2014). However, Chevalier and Ellison reveal that 
there is no difference between the performance of funds managed by managers with 
an MBA degree and managers without an MBA degree. This implies that whether or 
not a manager holds an MBA has no influence on mutual fund performance. 
 
Another group of studies reports different findings. Gottesman and Morey (2006), for 
example, adopt a new method to examine whether fund managers with an MBA 
have an impact on fund performance by using the mean GMAT scores and Business 
Week rankings instead of the quality of the MBA program. The outcomes show that 
fund managers who attended MBA programs that rank within the top 30 Business 
Week rankings outperform both managers without MBA degrees and managers with 
MBA degrees from unranked programs. More recently, Fang and Wang (2015) have 
claimed that fund managers in China with an MBA or a CFA qualification can 
outperform their peers and achieve a better overall comprehensive performance. 
Hence, it is possible to infer that fund managers who hold a higher degree have the 
ability to beat the market in the Chinese mutual fund industry.  
Hypothesis 3: fund managers who hold an MBA degree, PhD, or CFA qualification 
have a positive influence on fund performance 
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With reference to the effect of the mutual fund management structure, three different 
outcomes for mutual fund performance have been found. Firstly, from a theoretical 
perspective, team management can bring greater diversity of management style and 
judgment, and thus should increase returns.  There are several extant academic 
studies which point out the advantages of group decision-making. Sharp (1981) 
reveals that teams in the portfolio management industry are able to diversify more in 
terms of style and judgment. This point is supported by Barry and Starks (1984) and 
Sah and Stiglitz (1991). Furthermore, Hill (1982) and Herrenkohl (2004) and Dass et 
al (2013) argue that, in the context of portfolio management, teams are able to deal 
with larger amounts of information and have a wider range of specialized skills and 
knowledge.  
 
Nevertheless, in contrast to studies conducted in the field of management and 
psychology, Stock (2004) examines the role and performance of teams and finds 
that the differences between teams and individuals do not necessarily lead to 
superior performance. A similar outcome was found for the fund industry; most 
empirical studies fail to show that teams consistently outperform individuals. Prather 
and Middleton (2002) examine whether teams or individuals make better portfolio 
decisions. Using a list of mutual funds during the period from 1981 to 1994 obtained 
from CDA Investment Technology, Inc., their empirical results show that the effects 
of team management and individual management on fund performance are similar. 
This implies that there is no evidence to show that teams make better decisions, an 
outcome which is similar to that obtained in studies by Bliss et al (2008) and Liu 
(2009).  
 
However, recent findings by Han et al (2008) are an exception; their model predicts 
that team–managed funds will perform better than individually–managed funds. The 
results are only consistent with the prediction when the model accounts for 
managerial self–selection; otherwise, team–managed funds will underperform 
individually–managed funds. Additionally, by examining 343 Chinese funds between 
2003 and 2012, Liu et al (2014) find that team–managed funds outperform 
individually–managed funds.  
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By contrast, several other studies show that team-managed funds actually 
underperform individually-managed funds (Chen et al; 2004 and Bar et al; 2005). Bar 
et al (2005) use a data source taken from the CRSP survivor bias-free mutual fund 
database to investigate the effect of fund management structure on fund 
performance, performance persistence and fund inflows. Regarding the effects of 
team management on fund performance, the findings show that team-managed 
funds have a negative influence on fund performance. In addition, they state that the 
benefits of team management are overcompensated by some explicit costs and 
team-specific inefficiencies. Philpot and Peterson (2006) also show that team–
managed funds perform poorly compared to individually–managed funds in the real 
estate mutual fund industry. 
 
Recently, Karaginnidis (2010) examined the impact of the management team 
structure on open-end mutual fund during the period 1997-2004. The results reveal 
that team–managed funds underperformed individually–managed funds in terms of 
risk–adjusted returns during the bear market from 2001–2004. However, the results 
are not consistent with those obtained for the bull market period from 1997 – 2000 
for growth–oriented and income–oriented funds. Bar et al (2011) used a dataset 
which covers both team–managed and individually–managed US equity mutual 
funds to test the diversification of opinion theory and the group shift theory. The 
outcomes confirm the diversification of opinion theory, meaning that teams are less 
likely to obtain a superior performance compared to sole managers. These results 
remain robust after taking into account fund and managerial characteristics. Hence, 
the possible impact of the management structure on fund performance is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 4:  team management has a negative influence on fund performance 
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Chapter Three: Data and Methodology 
 
This study employs an unbalanced panel data Ordinary Least Square (OLS) fixed–
effects model and a dynamic panel model to observe the direction of causality 
between equity mutual fund performance and some key managerial attributes during 
the period from 2005 to 2013. The main source of equity mutual fund data, including 
performance information and managerial attributes, is the China Securities Market & 
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database (or called the Guo Tai An (GTA) database). 
The turnover rate was manually collected from each of the relevant fund company 
websites. The CSMAR database is a leading global provider of Chinese data and 
provides seven major database series, including, stock market, corporate, bonds, 
funds, industry, and economy. In addition, the CSMAR database contains all the 
required information about managers (education, gender and work experience) and 
daily fund returns for all funds. However, this paper only focuses on the performance 
of equity funds. Hence, funds with less than 50% invested in equity securities are 
eliminated.  
 
Furthermore, fund performance details and managerial attributes were collected 
separately for each year of the sample period from 2005 to 2013. The paper restricts 
the sample to open–ended equity funds and excludes bonds, currency and index 
funds. Therefore, within this nine–year period, the sample considers over 1,604 
annual observations for 325 distinct equity funds. According to the CSMAR database, 
the sample of funds has nine different investment objectives, which are as follows: 
aggressive growth; growth; income; balance; appreciation; investment value; stable 
growth; value optimization; and value.  
 
Table 1 shows the fund categories based on their investment objectives and 
contains the number of funds in each category during the period from 2005 to 2013. 
This table implies that there are four types of fund categories which remain relatively 
stable over the nine-year period, namely: growth; income; value optimization; and 
value. The five remaining fund categories continue to increase year by year, with the 
largest proportion of funds in the stable growth category.  
 
- Insert Table 1 approximately here - 
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Furthermore, survivorship bias is a well–documented problem in many empirical 
studies. Survivorship bias arises if a sample only includes surviving mutual funds but 
not dead mutual funds during the observation period. Therefore, survivorship bias 
can contribute to the average performance measures being overstated. 
Consequently, this paper collects equity funds separately for each year during the 
sample period from 2005 to 2013, in order to reduce the impact of survivorship bias. 
 
In addition, benchmark error is another factor which can influence the average 
performance measures. A number of studies find that the fund performance is 
sensitive to the benchmark used to proxy the market return. For instance, a sample 
of a small capitalization portfolio uses a large market capitalization index as a 
benchmark, resulting in a positive bias. However, by employing the SFA model, the 
benchmark error problem will be eliminated in this paper. 
 
Description of variables  
 
In order to estimate the efficiency score of equity funds, this paper follows the 
relevant studies which have been conducted using a non-parametric model, namely: 
Murthi et al (1997); Basso and Funari (2001, 2003); Hu and Chang (2008); and 
Matallin–Saez et al (2014). According to these studies, the following variables can be 
summarized and used as inputs: expense ratio; standard deviation; loads; and the 
mean fund return can be used as an output. The selection of inputs and outputs for 
this paper comprises two inputs; the expense ratio; and standard deviation; and one 
output: the mean return. The first input is the proxy variable for cost and the second 
input is the proxy for risk. Thus, the expense ratio can be calculated by dividing the 
fund expenses by the total fund assets. In addition, fund expenses include 
management, administrative, operating, and advertising costs. However, sales 
charges are not included in the expense ratio. Hu and Chang (2008) use a different 
input variable: the standard deviation of the fund return.  
 
The next stage involves analyzing the direction of causality between equity mutual 
fund performance and specific managerial attributes, namely: fund manager’s length 
of tenure; team management structure; educational factors; and the number of funds 
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under management. The tenure is the number of years that a manager has managed 
a fund for, and is used to measure managerial experience. The next independent 
variable, team management structure, represents the number of managers involved 
in managing a fund. The definition of a team-managed fund is one managed by two 
or more mangers for more than six months during a one year period; otherwise, the 
fund is deemed as being controlled by a single fund manager. Therefore, 
management structure is a dummy variable, where a single manager is equal to zero 
and team management is equal to one.  
 
The variables representing managerial educational factors are: an MBA degree; PhD; 
and Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) qualification. In the case of a team–managed 
fund, if one of the managers has held an MBA degree, a PhD, or a CFA qualification 
for more than six months during a one year period, this is counted as a fund 
managed by someone with an MBA degree, PhD, or CFA. A manager with an MBA 
degree is equal to one and a manager without an MBA is equal to zero. The 
definitions of a PhD and CFA are similar to that of an MBA degree. Lastly, the funds 
under management variable denotes the number of funds under a sole manager or 
team of managers.  
 
Control variables 
 
In the first stage of estimating the fund efficiency score, this paper adopts the control 
variable of market risk (standard deviation of market return). According to Zeng et al 
(2006) and Jin and Wu (2007), the market return can be obtained by calculating 40% 
of the Shanghai Composite index, 20% of the Shanghai Government bond index and 
40% of the Shenzhen composite index. In addition, the Shanghai Government bond 
index represents changes in the Chinese bond market as a whole. This variable 
indicates the market perception of future returns.  
 
Furthermore, this paper uses a number of variables representing fund-specific 
characteristics which have an impact on equity fund performance, namely: fund size; 
illiquidity ratio; turnover ratio; and fund age. The fund size is measured by the denary 
logarithm of a fund’s total net assets (TNA). The TNA is obtained by subtracting the 
total liabilities from the total assets. The fund size is a proxy for the sensitivity of the 
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investment flow to fund performance. Annaert et al (2003) argue that efficiency is 
positively correlated with fund size, whilst most research points out that scale erodes 
fund performance (Williamson, 1998; Stein, 2002; Chen et al, 2004; Nanda and 
Wang, 2008) or finds a significant inverse relationship between fund size and fund 
performance (Yan, 2008; Tang et al, 2012) in terms of traditional fund performance 
measurement. Based on the data envelopment analysis (DEA) model, Zhao and 
Wang (2007) find that most Chinese mutual funds experienced a decrease in fund 
size. The illiquidity ratio is based on the measure used by Amihud (2002). The higher 
the value of the illiquidity ratio, the lower the portfolio weighted average of a fund’s 
portfolio liquidity.  
 
The fund age is used to denote the number of years that a fund has been operating 
for. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) point out that young funds significantly outperform 
older funds, which means that fund age is negatively related to fund performance. 
On the other hand, fund age has an insignificant impact on fund efficiency (Annaert 
et al, 2003). The turnover rate is a percentage obtained by dividing the minimum 
annual purchase or sales stocks by the average annual amount of fund wealth. 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find that turnover is significantly and positively related to 
equity fund performance. Conversely, some studies point out that there is no link 
between turnover and fund performance (Ippolito, 1989; Droms and Walker, 1994; 
and Gottesman and Morey, 2006). Furthermore, this paper uses the GDP growth 
rate, unemployment rate and inflation rate as the macroeconomic control variables.  
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 contains the mean, standard deviations, and minimum and maximum values 
for the variables used to estimate the efficiency of funds, the variables representing 
managerial attributes, and the control variables for the period between 2005 and 
2013 in China. It is interesting to note that the market risk is higher on average than 
the fund risk. With respect to the managerial attributes, management structure and 
education all have a low mean value in this sample. This means that the majority of 
equity mutual funds are controlled by a single manager and/or a manager without a 
higher degree or CFA qualification. In addition, the average time that a fund manager 
has worked with a fund is short (2.7 years). Concerning the fund-specific variables, 
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the average fund turnover rate per year is 276.6%, while the maximum value of the 
average fund turnover rate is found to be 8622.79%, and the average time since the 
funds were founded is nearly 4.25 years. 
 
- Insert Table 2 approximately here – 
 
Multicollinearity 
 
The following table reports all the correlation coefficients of the independent 
variables. It shows that the majority of variables have correlation coefficients below 
0.3. This implies that the independent variables in the regression are not highly 
correlated. However, several correlations are noteworthy. Firstly, it seems that there 
is a negative correlation between fund managers with PhDs and fund managers with 
Master’s degrees. As these variables are not applied in the same regression, the 
issue of multicollinearity is not serious. Secondly, within the macroeconomic 
variables category, the highest correlation is found between the GDP growth rate 
and the unemployment rate.  
 
- Insert Table 3 approximately here – 
 
The first stage regression methodology 
 
Determining the most appropriate way to measure mutual fund performance is a 
significant issue for analyzing the impact of managerial attributes on mutual fund 
performance. Different types of methods for measuring mutual fund performance 
have been employed in previous studies, for instance: the market benchmark 
adjusted model; the Sharpe ratio; the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) model; and 
multifactor models.  In recent years, a growing body of studies has applied frontier 
analysis techniques for evaluating the performance of mutual funds (Annaert et al, 
2003; Santo et al, 2005; Gregoriou et al, 2005; Babalos et al, 2014; and Matallin-
Saez et al, 2014). There are two different types of frontier-based methodologies: the 
parametric approach (Stochastic Frontier Approach - SFA); and the nonparametric 
approach (Data Environment Analysis - DEA). These new frontier-based methods 
are employed to estimate an efficient frontier, where funds operate perfectly, and the 
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distance between the point at which funds operate less efficiently and the efficient 
frontier. However, no consensus has been reached about the most appropriate 
estimation methodology. This paper employs the parametric approach to frontier 
analysis.  
 
 
Traditional evaluation methods 
 
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is the most basic single index model which 
has been adopted in many studies on equity fund performance. The intercept of 
Alpha in the CAPM model is called Jensen’s Alpha and is used to indicate the 
measurement of a mutual fund. For instance, a positive Jensen’s Alpha implies that 
the fund manager has the ability to beat the market. The CAPM model is expressed 
in equation (3). It shows that the return on any security is equal to the risk–free rate 
of interest plus the adjusted market return, multiplied by the systematic risk of 
security beta. By subtracting the risk free rate from both sides of the theoretical 
equation, the performance measure – Jensen’s Alpha - can be obtained from the 
model.  
 𝑅!" − 𝑅!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽! 𝑅!" − 𝑅!" + 𝜖                                              (1) 
 
where 𝑅!" is the return of an equity mutual fund i over period t; 𝑅!" is the one year 
fixed deposit rate over period t; 𝛼!    is the Jensen’s Alpha for fund i; 𝛽!  is the 
systematic risk of the security in the Chinese market; 𝑅!" is the market return over 
period t; 𝑅!! − 𝑅!" is the market risk premium;  and 𝜖 is an error term. Under the 
efficient market hypothesis, alpha should be zero. When a security exhibits an 
excellent performance, the value of alpha is positive and statistically significant.  
 
The Sharp ratio is the excess return per unit of volatility or total risk. The higher a 
fund’s Sharp ratio, the better the returns obtained for the same risk. The equation for 
the Sharp ratio can be expressed as follows: 
 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = (𝑟! − 𝑟!)/𝜎!                                          (2) 
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where 𝑟! is the mean portfolio return; 𝑟! is the one year fixed deposit rate; and 𝜎! is 
the portfolio standard deviation.  
 
Alternative evaluation methods 
 
The Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) is an alternative method for measuring the 
performance of mutual funds. The Stochastic Frontier Analysis approach was first 
developed by Aigner er al (1977) and Meeusen (1977). According to this framework, 
it specifies a functional form for the cost, profit, or the production relationship 
between inputs, outputs and environmental factors and also allows for random errors. 
It also allows inefficiency to be identified by the error term. Hence, this paper uses 
the production function model employed by Battess and Coelli (1995) to develop a 
random–effects time varying model for estimating the fund specific level of technical 
efficiency which is assumed to be normal truncated.  The general model for 
estimating fund efficiency can be expressed as follows: 
 
 𝑙𝑛𝑅!" = 𝑓 𝑁!"𝑍!" +   𝑣!" + 𝑢!"                                        (3) 
 
 
where 𝑅!" represents the fund return for i at year t, N is a vector of fund-specific  
variables affecting this return; and Z is a vector of the control variable. Furthermore, 
N has two inputs: the expense ratio; and the standard deviation of returns; and one 
output mean return. Z is the standard deviation of the market return and reflects 
market perceptions of future returns. The last two variables in equation one are the 
most important for this paper. The first one is 𝑣!", which is a random variable and is 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed. The second component 𝑢!" 
stands for non-negative variables and accounts for the fund’s inefficiency relative to 
the stochastic frontier. 
 
This paper employs the translog specification, which results in empirical estimations. 
The translog function takes the form: 
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 ln 𝑅!" = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑙𝑛𝑁!,!! + 1 2 𝛼!"!! 𝑙𝑛𝑁!,!𝑙𝑛𝑁!,! + 𝛽!! 𝑙𝑛𝑍!,!+ 1 2 𝜃!,!!! 𝑙𝑛𝑍!,!𝑙𝑛𝑁!,! + 𝜈!,! + 𝜇!,!                                                                                                                      (4) 
                                                  
 
where  𝑅!" represents the fund return for i at year t, N is a vector of fund-specific  
variables affecting this return; and Z is a vector of the control variable;  𝑣!" is assumed 
to follow a symmetric normal distribution around the frontier; and 𝑢!" represents the 
fund’s efficiency compared to the best-practice level within the industry. The 
restrictions of standard linear homogeneity and symmetry are imposed in this paper, 
whilst some dummies designed to capture any difference across specific investment 
objectives for Chinese equity funds are also included. The efficiency scores are 
obtained from the following equation: 𝐸𝑓𝑓!,! = exp −𝜇!,! − 1 . The value of the 
efficiency score can vary from 0 to 1 where 1 implies a perfectly efficient fund, and 
deviations from 1 represent inefficiency.  
 
 
Second stage regression methodology 
 
The next stage involves examining the underlying causality between a fund’s 
efficiency and some key managerial attribute variables, namely: team management 
structure; educational factors; tenure; and funds under management, using fixed–
effects estimation and dynamic panel analysis. The fixed effects model enables us to 
control for omitted heterogeneous fund–specific effects. Therefore, the general 
model for measuring the relationship between fund efficiency and managerial 
attributes can be represented as follows:  
 
 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹!,! = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑀𝐴!,! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠!,! + 𝜀!,!                                            (5) 
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where 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹!,!  are the dependent variables and represent the measure of fund 
performance, as obtained by the efficiency score, the Sharp ratio and Jensen’s 
Alpha for a fund in period t; 𝑀𝐴!,! are the managerial attribute variables of team 
management structure, tenure, funds under management and educational factors 
(MBA degree, PhD degree, Master degree and CFA);  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠!,! are the 
fund-specific characteristics variables: fund size; turnover ratio; fund age; and 
illiquidity ratio, which have an influence on fund performance;   𝜀!,! is the error term. 
The paper also includes year dummies designed to capture any time effects. 
 
Furthermore, in the case of the dynamic panel model, the paper opts for the two–
step system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators (Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) with bias–corrected robust standard errors, which 
was introduced by Windmeijer (2005). This model includes one lag of fund 
performance as an independent variable. In addition to this, the lagged dependent 
variable can be used to measure the persistence of the fund performance. The 
results of the two–step system GMM estimator are tested via Hansen’s diagnostic 
test for instrument validity and the test for second–order autocorrelation of the error 
terms introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991).  
 
Hence, the dynamic panel model takes the following form: 
 𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹!,! = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹!,!!! + 𝛽!𝑀𝐴!,! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙  𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠!,! + 𝜀!,!                            (6) 
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Chapter Four: Empirical results 
 
Fund efficiency score 
This section presents the equity funds’ efficiency scores during the sample period 
from 2005 to 2013, derived using the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA). Table 4 
shows the evolution of the mean efficiency score and the average efficiency scores 
of Chinese equity funds for the period of analysis.  
 
- Insert Table 4 approximately here – 
 
Table 4 reveals that the overall mean efficiency score of the funds remains at a high 
level during the entire sample period, except for the year 2008. The main reason for 
this low mean efficiency score in 2008 is the effects of the global financial crisis 
throughout the financial system. The average mean efficiency score for all equity 
funds in China reached a maximum value of approximately 84%. Regarding the 
dispersion of efficiency scores, the table indicates that the highest value was 
achieved in 2008. This means that there was significant heterogeneity of funds 
during 2008 due to the effects of the financial crisis. After 2008, the efficiency score 
follows an upward trend. These results are similar to the findings from the studies by 
Babalos et al (2014) on the mean efficiency score of US equity funds, during the 
same period from 2005 to 2010.  
 
Figures1 to 3 illustrate the average performance measures (Stochastic Frontier 
Approach, Sharp ratio method and CAPM Alpha) across the equity mutual funds 
industry from 2005 to 2013. The graphs show that the average Sharp ratio and Alpha 
are nearly all positive except during the financial crisis period from 2008 to 2009. 
This finding further confirms that the high average values for the efficiency score are 
feasible for the Chinese equity mutual fund industry. The following graphs exhibit 
similar patterns during the sample period.  
 
- Insert Figures 1 to 3 approximately here – 
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The impacts of managerial attributes on equity fund performance 
 
The following sections present the baseline regressions to examine the relationship 
between managerial factors associated with equity mutual funds and equity fund 
performance (efficiency score, Sharp ratio and Jensen’s Alpha) by taking into 
consideration the impacts of fund-specific characteristics. This paper shows the 
results for both a fixed effects model to take account of the unobserved 
heterogeneity across funds, and the two-step ‘system’ GMM model to control for 
endogeneity. The dependent variables are as follows: (i) Efficiency score; (ii) Sharp 
ratio; and (iii) Jensen’s Alpha.  
 
 
Fixed effects model 
 
With regards to the team management structure, the paper finds that the team 
management structure has a negative impact on equity fund performance according 
to Model 1 (Tables 5 and 6). The results show that the effect on fund performance is 
significant at the 5% level in the Sharp ratio model, but the effect is insignificant for 
the Efficiency score model. Additionally, although team management structure exerts 
a positive impact on Jensen’s Alpha (Table 7, Model 1), the effect is statistically 
insignificant. The results from the Efficiency score model are consistent with those of 
Stock (2004), Prather and Middleton (2002) and Liu (2009), as they find similar 
outcomes for the effects of team management and individual management on fund 
performance.  
 
- Insert Tables 5 to 7 approximately here – 
 
 
The length of the fund manager’s tenure has a negative impact on equity fund 
performance at the 5% significance level (Table 5, Model 2) and the 10% 
significance level (Table 6, Model 2). By contrast, the paper finds a positive and 
statistically insignificant impact on Jensen’s Alpha (Table 7, Model 2). The table also 
shows that changes in a fund manager’s tenure have a greater impact on the Sharp 
ratio compared with the Efficiency score, as the estimated values of the coefficients 
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are 0.006 and 0.002 respectively. Therefore, if a manager’s length of tenure 
continues to increase, the funds that he/she manages tend to perform worse than 
those whose managers are relatively new to a fund.  
 
This result is consistent with previous studies by Zeng et al (2006), Switzer and 
Huang (2007) and Hu et al (2012), suggesting that the longer a manager has 
executed the investment strategy of a fund and managed its portfolio trading 
activities, the worse the equity fund performance will be. This conflicts with the view 
put forward by Golec (1996), Philpot et al (2000) and Lee et al (2008), who claim that 
a fund manager with a longer tenure should produce a superior investment 
performance, as his/her ability and experience grows and becomes more 
appreciated. This finding could be explained by the fact that fund managers with a 
short tenure will tend to work harder than fund managers with a long tenure because 
they may want to advance their careers or avoid losing their job due to a poor 
performance record (Hu et al, 2012).  
 
With respect to the impact of funds under management on equity fund performance, 
the results indicate that managed funds have a strong negative correlation with 
equity fund performance at the 1% significance level (Model 3, Table 6 and 7) and at 
the 5% significance level (Model 3, Table 5). Although these influences are relatively 
small in magnitude in all the models, the Sharp ratio and Alpha correlation 
coefficients of funds under management are approximately four times more than the 
efficiency score coefficients. The estimated values of the coefficients are 0.014, 
0.013 and 0.003 respectively. This means that for every extra fund managed by a 
fund manager, the fund performance will decline by 0.014, 0.013 or 0.003 points, 
depending on the different models used.  
 
This finding is consistent with previous studies by Prather et al (2004), Hu and 
Chang (2008)d and Hu et al (2012)e, as they claim that if a manager looks after more 
than two funds, then the fund performance will decrease. Theoretically, if a fund 
manager has to oversee several funds, it is logical that they will perform less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
d	  Hu	  and	  Huang’s	  (2008)	  findings	  are	  based	  on	  a	  three-­‐stage	  data	  envelopment	  analysis	  (DEA)	  approach.	  	  
e	  Hu	  et	  al’s	  (2012)	  findings	  are	  based	  on	  a	  four–stage	  data	  development	  analysis	  (DEA)	  approach.	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effectively, because their time and effort will be spread more thinly and thus 
management effectiveness will also be reduced.  
 
Regarding the influence of educational factors on equity fund performance, the 
results reveal some variations depending on what type of degree the fund manager 
holds. Firstly, the paper finds that fund managers with an MBA degree have a 
positive impact on equity fund performance (Table 5, Model 4). In contrast, a 
negative correlation is shown in Table 6 and 7. The influences are statistically 
insignificant for the Efficiency score (Table 5, Model 4) and the Sharp ratio (Table 6, 
Model 4). Unexpectedly, the effect is statistically significant for Jensen’s Alpha at the 
10% significance level (Table 7, Model 4). The outcomes obtained from Tables 6 and 
7 support the idea that the performance of an equity mutual fund is unrelated to 
whether the fund manager holds an MBA degree, as observed in the previous study 
by Chevalier and Ellison (1999a). 
 
Moreover, this finding is comparable with that of Gottesman and Morey (2006) who 
state that, generally, whether or not the manager holds an MBA degree has little 
influence on mutual fund performance. Furthermore, they also claim that only if a 
manager has attended a top or very high-ranking MBA program, will it have an 
influence on mutual fund performance in the U.S. Therefore, one possible 
explanation is that the quality of the MBA schools attended by managers might be an 
important factor for achieving a better performance. Unfortunately, there is 
insufficient data to test this hypothesis in the Chinese mutual fund market.  
 
In Model 5, the paper replicates the regressions carried out in Model 4 for each of 
the tables, but the MBA degree dummy is replaced by the PhD degree dummy. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the paper finds that, if a fund manager has a PhD, this has a 
negative impact on the equity fund performance (Model 5, Table 5 and 6). A positive 
sign is obtained for the Jensen’s Alpha model (Table 7, Model 5). The effects are 
statistically insignificant in all the models. This finding is consistent with the earlier 
study by Gottesman and Morey (2006), who argue that there is no distinction 
between managers with, and managers without, PhDs.  
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In the case of CFA qualifications, the paper reveals that, if a fund manager holds a 
CFA qualification, this has a negative impact on the equity fund performance, as 
shown in Model 6 (Tables 5 and 7), but a positive impact on the Sharp ratio (Table 6). 
The effects are statistically insignificant for all the models. This finding is not 
consistent with that of Switzer and Huang (2007), who state that fund managers with 
CFA status outperform their counterparts without CFA qualifications.  
 
Finally, when the aforementioned educational factors are replaced by a Master’s 
degree, as a robustness exercise, the impact on fund performance is positively 
significant at the 10% level in Model 7 (Table 5). Having a fund manager with a 
Master’s degree is also found to be consistently positive in relation to the Sharp ratio 
and Alpha (Tables 6 and 7), but the effects are insignificant. This finding implies that 
the equity fund performance could be improved when a fund is managed by a 
manager with a Master’s degree.  
 
According to the above findings, there is no evidence from Tables 5 to 7 to support 
the claim that managers with MBA degrees, PhDs or CFA qualifications perform any 
better than other managers with less formal educational qualifications under the 
Efficiency score model. In fact, the paper finds that the only type of educational 
qualification held by managers that seems to have an effect on the equity fund 
performance is Master’s degrees. This finding suggests that managers with Master’s 
degrees are simply more intelligent than other managers. Alternatively, it may simply 
be the case that the percentage of fund managers with Master’s degrees in the 
sample is much higher than for other types of qualification (see Table 2). With a 
small sample size such as this, it can be hard to detect the effects accurately. In 
addition, another possible explanation is that, rather than the quality of the managers, 
the main factors which cause the fund to perform well are efficient support staff or 
better in-house research (Gottesman and Morey, 2006). However, the lack of 
relevant data means that this hypothesis cannot be tested.  
 
Furthermore, by dividing the sample into two groups based on fund size – small and 
large - the paper reveals that the team management structure has a negative impact 
on the efficiency score in Panel A (large fund size) of Table 8 (Model 1) at the 1% 
significance level. The negative sign of the coefficient implies that equity funds 
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managed by a team perform worse than funds managed by a sole manager. This 
outcome is similar to the findings of previous empirical studies by Chen et al (2004), 
Bar et al (2005), Massa et al (2006), Philpot and Peterson (2006), Karagiannidis 
(2010), Bar et al (2011) and Ferreira et al (2012). In contrast to earlier studies by 
Barry and Starks (1984), Sah and Stiglitz (1991), Hill (1982), Herrenkohl (2004) and 
Liu et al (2014), they argue that there is a positive relationship between team-
managed funds and fund performance, as teams tend to have a broader range of 
specialized skills and knowledge which enables them to deal with larger amounts of 
information. Massa et al (2006) suggest that funds managed by a team 
underperform due to the anonymity of the managers. 
 
In addition, Karagiannidis (2010) finds that funds with multiple managers 
underperform compared to their individually–managed counterparts only during the 
bear market, but not in the bull market, and suggests that the differences in 
management team structure reporting may yield these contradictory outcomes. 
Theoretically, if team managers cannot make immediate decisions about their 
investment strategy, the organizational effectiveness of the team will suffer 
(Rasmusen, 1987). The less effective a team is, the worse the fund performance will 
be. Furthermore, the presence of free-riders in a team will also contribute to poor 
mutual fund performance (Sah and Stiglitz, 1988).  
 
Although team-management cannot boost fund performance, team-managed funds 
still have a contribution to make. For instance, teams can attract more individual 
investors by using their public social networks. The fund manager is rewarded by 
cash inflows into the funds, and fund managers can earn up to 2.5% of the total 
assets as their compensation. This might explain why mutual fund companies still 
prefer to adopt a team management structure. Thus, this finding lends support to the 
H1 hypothesis that employing a team management structure will erode the 
performance of mutual funds. 
 
The other findings in Panel A of Table 8 are consistent with the previous results 
obtained in Table 5, except that the variable of Master’s degree is not statistically 
significant. Panel B of Table 8 presents the results of managerial attributes on small 
fund performance. Unexpectedly, in this case, if fund managers hold a PhD, this 
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exerts a negative impact on fund performance in Model 5 at the 5% significance level. 
The other managerial variables are not correlated with fund performance when the 
fund manager manages a small fund.  
 
- Insert Table 8 approximately here – 
 
 
Table 9 reveals the impact of managerial attributes on fund performance under 
different investment objectives. In relation to these various investment objectives, the 
impacts of managerial attributes on fund performance are completely different. Panel 
A of Table 9 illustrates that funds under management and a fund manager holding a 
PhD have a negative impact on equity fund performance at the 10% significance 
level (Table 9, Models 3 and 5). Fund managers with a Master’s degree have a 
strong positive impact on equity fund performance at the 1% significance level (Table 
9, Model 7). Compared with Panel B of Table 9, only the fund manager’s length of 
tenure is negatively correlated with fund performance at the 10% significance level 
(Model 2). The results imply that funds with growth investment objectives are more 
sensitive to how many funds are run by the fund manager, and whether the manager 
has a PhD or a Master’s degree, but less sensitive to the fund manager’s length of 
tenure than funds with value investment objectives.  
 
- Insert Table 9 approximately here – 
 
 
Dynamic panel analysis 
 
Due to concerns about endogeneity, Table 10 presents the results of the dynamic 
panel analysis (the two-step ‘system’ GMM model) by applying the efficiency score 
which was employed in the previous fixed effects model. This paper reveals that the 
basic diagnostics test (AR (2)) for second-order autocorrelation in second differences 
and the Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions are insignificant in all 
corresponding models for Table 10. Furthermore, generally, the impacts of almost all 
of the managerial attributes are in line with the results obtained from the fixed effects 
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model, while the effects of the control variables on equity fund performance are 
different. 
 
The measure of fund performance persistence, lagged dependent variables, is 
significant in all corresponding models. More specifically, fund performance 
persistence has a negative impact on equity fund performance at the 1% significance 
level, as shown in Table 10. The negative and significant sign obtained for 
performance persistence does not support the winner’s repeat hypothesis referred to 
in the literature. On the contrary, this finding suggests that equity fund performance 
is more likely to undergo a reversal pattern in the Chinese fund industry.  
 
In general, managerial attributes (team management structure, tenure and funds 
under management) do significantly affect the efficiency scores. Firstly, with respect 
to the team management structure shown in Table 10, the relationship between 
equity fund performance and team management structure is negative. The table also 
shows that the effect on fund performance is significant at the 1% level (Model 1). 
Corresponding to the results of the fixed effects estimations, the two-step GMM 
models confirm the impacts of the team management structure on the Efficiency 
score and improve the level of significance. This finding is not consistent with that of 
Adam et al (2013)f, as they claim that team-management has a positive impact on 
fund performance by considering the effect of independent directors as a factor. 
Thus, this finding lends support to the H1 Hypothesis that employing a team 
management structure will erode the performance of equity mutual funds.  
 
Model 2 in Table 10 shows that the fund manager’s length of tenure has a negative 
impact on equity fund performance. This finding is consistent with the findings 
obtained from fixed effects models. Another variable which has an influence is 
whether the funds are under management; the study finds that this has a negative 
effect on equity fund performance at the 1% significance level (Table 10, Model 3). 
This finding supports the previous conclusion reached from the fixed effects model. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
f	  Their	  results	  are	  obtained	  via	  the	  2SLS	  instrument	  variable	  approach	  which	  uses	  the	  percentage	  of	  team-­‐
managed	  funds	  in	  a	  fund	  family	  as	  an	  instrument	  variable.	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With regard to the impact of educational factors on equity fund performance which 
was tested using Models 4 to 7, the results are broadly similar to those reported in 
the fixed effects model with the exception of holding a Master’s degree. That is, the 
paper finds that whether a fund manager(s) has a Master’s degree is statistically 
insignificant. In summary, almost all of the educational factors are not correlated with 
equity fund performance in China. These findings are highly consistent with those of 
Gottesman and Morey (2006)g, who use an instrumental variable estimation to 
conclude that there is no link between fund managers having an MBA degree, a PhD 
or a CFA qualification and fund performance.  
 
- Insert Table 10 approximately here – 
 
 
Control variables 
 
In terms of the control variables, the paper reports evidence of a positive and 
significant impact of fund size on the Sharp ratio and Jensen’s Alpha, while the effect 
on the Efficiency score is negative and statistically significant. This negative 
coefficient is consistent with studies by Chen et al (2004) and Yan (2008), who claim 
that large funds tend to have higher bureaucracy, hierarchy and related coordination 
costs as well as liquidity constraints. The paper finds that an increase in the illiquidity 
ratio has a positive influence on equity fund performance in almost all of the 
corresponding tables in the fixed effects models. However, most of them are 
statistically insignificant, with the exception of the results obtained from the Sharp 
ratio model in Table 6. Additionally, the dynamic panel models confirm this positive 
impact on equity fund performance.  
 
Regarding the impact of the turnover rate, the paper finds a negative and statistically 
significant correlation between the turnover rate and equity fund performance in the 
fixed effects models shown in Tables 5 to 7. The dynamic panel models (see Table 
10) produce similar findings, but the effects are insignificant for all the models. This 
finding is consistent with previous studies by Malkiel (1995) and Carhart (1997) and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
g	  They	  did	  not	  report	  the	  results	  of	  the	  IV	  estimation	  in	  the	  article.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  IV	  estimation	  are	  
observed	  from	  the	  Tables.	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Haslem et al (2008). However, it is in contrast to that of Chevalier and Ellison (1997), 
who suggest that very frequent trading is likely to generate a better performance.  
 
The paper also reports that fund age has a strong negative and significant effect on 
the efficiency score (Table 5), while its influence on the Sharp ratio and Jensen’s 
Alpha is positive in all the corresponding tables (see Tables 6 and 7) for the fixed 
effects model. The effects are statistically significant at the 1% level, but small in 
magnitude. However, the results obtained from the dynamic panel models are 
opposite to the findings from the fixed effects models. Regarding the 
macroeconomics variables, the paper finds that they all have a significant impact on 
fund performance, but the effects vary under the fixed effects models and dynamic 
panel models.  
 
 
Robustness check 
 
This section discusses the last robustness check. When the standard deviation of 
returns and mean returns are replaced by the tracking error and active return as a 
robustness exercise, the impact of most of the control variables on the Efficiency 
score is recorded in Table 11. It is noteworthy that the effects of the fund manager’s 
length of tenure, whether funds are under management and whether the fund 
manager has a Master’s degree all remain consistent with prior results. In Model 1, 
as reported in Table 11, the team management structure is found to be positively 
correlated with the Efficiency score, whilst the relationship is negative in the other 
models.  
 
- Insert Table 11 approximately here – 
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
 
This paper investigates the performance of Chinese equity mutual funds and 
examines the influences that managerial attributes may exert on fund performance 
by employing a fixed effects model and the two-step ‘system’ GMM model. In order 
to avoid the limitations of traditional fund performance methods, the paper adopts the 
Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA) to measure equity mutual fund performance in 
terms of an efficiency score. During the sample period from 2005 to 2013, the overall 
fund’s mean efficiency score remains at a high level, except during the year 2008. 
This is due to the effects of the global financial crisis.  
 
Furthermore, this paper reveals some new findings about the performance of equity 
funds in China and also about some of the key determinants of performance such as 
the team management structure, length of managerial tenure, funds under 
management and educational factors. Under the Efficiency score model, the paper 
points out that the team management structure, length of tenure and funds under 
management all have a statistically and negatively significant impact on an equity 
fund’s performance. With regard to the Sharp ratio model, the impacts of almost all 
of the managerial factors are consistent with the findings obtained from the Efficiency 
score model. In contrast to the Jensen’s Alpha model, the impacts of most 
managerial factors are inconsistent with the findings obtained from the Efficiency 
score model and the Sharp ratio model, except in the case of funds under 
management. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the effect of a fund manager 
holding a Master’s degree is positive and significantly related to the equity fund 
performance according to the Efficiency score model. 
 
Moreover, the paper offers some explanations for these findings. Firstly, the paper 
suggests that team-managed funds tend to perform worse than those funds which 
are managed by a single manager. The reason for this is that if team managers 
cannot make immediate decisions about their investment strategy, the organizational 
effectiveness of the team will diminish (Rasmusen, 1987). The less effective a team 
is, the worse the fund performance will be. In addition, the presence of free-riders in 
a team will also contribute to poor mutual fund performance (Sah and Stiglitz, 1988). 
Secondly, this paper also shows that a manager’s length of tenure is negatively 
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linked with fund performance. It implies that a fund whose manager or managers 
have a longer tenure will perform worse than those whose managers are relatively 
new to a fund (Zeng et al, 2006; Switzer and Huang, 2007; and Hu et al, 2012). This 
finding could be explained by the fact that fund managers with a relatively short 
tenure are more likely to work harder than fund managers with a longer tenure 
because they may want to advance their careers or avoid losing their job if they have 
a record of poor fund performance (Hu et al, 2012). 
 
With respect to funds under management, a negative relationship between funds 
under management and fund performance was obtained for the Chinese mutual 
funds industry. Prather et al (2004), Hu and Chang (2008), and Hu et al (2012) state 
that if a manager runs more than two funds, then fund performance will decrease. A 
possible explanation for this is that if a fund manager has to oversee several funds, it 
follows that they will perform less effectively because their time and effort will be 
spread more thinly and thus management effectiveness will also be reduced. 
 
Regarding the influence of educational factors, the results show that fund managers 
with an MBA, PhD or CFA qualification do not produce a better equity fund 
performance in all cases. Indeed, the paper finds that the only type of educational 
qualification that seems to influence equity fund performance is managers with 
Master’s degrees. Overall, these findings support Hypotheses 1 to 4.  
 
The findings of this paper could have possible policy implications for investors and 
professional managers. Investors should be aware that some managerial attributes 
might have an important influence on fund performance. For instance, team-
management of funds will not produce extra profits for investors, but it can benefit 
fund management companies by attracting more individual investors via a wider 
public social network. Investors should invest more in funds which are managed by a 
manager with a short tenure and who has very few funds under his/her control. 
Furthermore, in the case of professional fund managers, the findings suggest that 
they should not split their time between several funds, as doing so will reduce 
management effectiveness. 
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Table.1 Funds by investment objective 
 
 
 
Notes: This table presents that the number of funds by investment objective and the total number of funds by 
year from CSMAR database from the year 2005 to 2013. The definition of investment objectives is that: 
Aggressive growth: funds seeking rapid growth of capital by leveraging, short-selling, investing IPOs; Growth: 
funds seeking for common stock of growth companies, which indicate signs of above – average growth; Income: 
funds seeking current income; Balanced: seeking for long – term growth of both principal and income by investing 
in a mix of equities, bonds and money market instruments; Appreciation: funds seeking for growth of capital with 
little consideration of current income; Value investment: funds seeking for stocks with low P/B ratio and with 
significant growth potential; Stable growth: funds seeking for high quality public stocks in order to obtain long 
term stable growth; Value optimization: seeking for investing in companies with significant growth potential; Value: 
seeking capital appreciation by investing in medium and large cap companies which are currently undervalued. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investment	  objective 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Aggressive	  growth 6 11 18 25 25 26 30 35 35
Growth 7 11 18 24 27 41 53 66 66
Income 2 3 4 5 6 6 9 9 9
Balanced 5 5 6 6 9 9 9 9 9
Appreciation 4 4 10 19 28 29 34 38 38
Value	  investment 1 5 13 14 18 18 20 22 22
Stable	  growth 8 9 19 29 42 71 97 133 133
Value	  optimization 3 5 5 6 8 8 8 10 10
Value 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3
Total	  no.of	  funds 37 55 95 130 165 210 263 325 325
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Table.2 Overall Summary statistic on fund characteristics 
 
	  	   Variables	   Mean	   Std.Dev	   Min	   Max	  
Variables	  used	  to	  estimate	  
fund's	  efficiency	  
Mean	  return	  	   0.06	   0.38	   -­‐0.84	   1.76	  
Expense	  ratio	   0.03	   0.06	   0.00	   1.33	  
Risk	   0.05	   0.02	   0.00	   0.23	  
Market	  Risk	   0.06	   0.02	   0.04	   0.09	  
Managerial	  attributes	  
Management	  structure	   0.29	   0.45	   0	   1	  
Education	  (MBA)	   0.05	   0.23	   0	   1	  
Education	  (PHD)	   0.17	   0.37	   0	   1	  
Education	  (Master)	   0.76	   0.42	   0	   1	  
Education	  (CFA)	   0.13	   0.33	   0	   1	  
Tenure	   2.68	   1.42	   1	   8	  
Funds	  under	  
management	   1.93	   1.06	   1	   10	  
Funds	  specific	  variables	  
Fund	  size	  (in	  Billions)	   3.92	   4.9	   0.01	   4.14	  
Illiquidity	  ratio	  	  (%)	   0.67	   0.67	   0.003	   10.51	  
Turnover	  (%)	   276.6	   344.45	   7.36	   8622.79	  
Fund	  age	   4.25	   2.11	   1	   11	  
Macroeconomics	  variables	  
GDP	  growth	  rate	  (%)	   9.26	   1.77	   7.65	   14.16	  
Unemployment	  rate	  (%)	   4.36	   0.21	   3.8	   4.6	  
Inflation	  rate	  (%)	   4.13	   3.04	   -­‐0.61	   7.8	  
 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and 
maximum values for the variables used in estimating fund efficiency, managerial attribute factors and 
funds control variables from the sample period between 2005 and 2013. 
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Table. 3 Correlation matrix of independent variables 
 
 
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients for persistence and fund characteristic and managerial attributes from 
2005 to 2013; The variable with an asterisk (*) are measured in logarithmic; Independent variables with high 
correlation coefficients are marked boldface; team management structure: dummy which takes the value of 1 if 
the fund is managed by a team and the value of 0 otherwise; Tenure is the number of years that manager has 
been with a fund; funds UM is the funds under management which presents the number of funds under a sole 
manager or team of managers; MBA degree is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the fund is 
managed by  a manager with MBA degree and the value of 0 otherwise; PHD degree is a dummy which takes the 
value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with PHD degree and the value of 0 otherwise; CFA takes the 
value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with CFA and the value of 0 otherwise; Illiquidity is used to 
measure the portfolio’s illiquidity level; Fund size is measured by total net asset (TNA) which is equal to total 
assets minus total liabilities; Turnover is the ratio of the minimum of annual purchase or sales stocks divided by 
the average annual amount of fund wealth; Fund age is the number of years that a fund has been founded; GDP 
growth rate is the rate of growth in gross domestic product of China in a given year; Unem is the unemployment 
rate; Inflation is the inflation rate. 
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Table 4 China funds’ efficiency score over time 
 
Year  N Mean Std.Dev Max Min 
2005 37 0.867 0.011 0.888 0.847 
2006 55 0.917 0.031 0.949 0.835 
2007 95 0.879 0.076 0.965 0.578 
2008 130 0.667 0.148 0.933 0.213 
2009 165 0.915 0.028 0.952 0.771 
2010 210 0.834 0.045 0.907 0.590 
2011 263 0.883 0.021 0.938 0.733 
2012 325 0.852 0.027 0.897 0.699 
2013 324 0.884 0.023 0.927 0.732 
 
Notes: estimation of China fund efficiency using a stochastic frontier analysis. 
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Table 5: Impact of managerial attributes on Fund efficiency score (Fixed effect model) 
 
Notes: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the fund managerial attributes on fund 
performance for the period 2005 to 2013. The dependent variable is Efficiency score: it obtained from SFA. For 
the independent variables the paper employ team management structure: dummy which takes the value of 1 if 
the fund is managed by a team and the value of 0 otherwise; Tenure is the number of years that manager has 
been with a fund; funds under management is the funds under management which presents the number of funds 
under a sole manager or team of managers; MBA degree is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
fund is managed by a manager with MBA degree and the value of 0 otherwise; PHD degree is a dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with PHD degree and the value of 0 otherwise; CFA 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with CFA and the value of 0 otherwise; Master degree 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with Master and the value of 0 otherwise; Illiquidity is 
used to measure the portfolio’s illiquidity level; Fund size is measured by total net asset (TNA) which is equal to 
total assets minus total liabilities; Turnover is the ratio of the minimum of annual purchase or sales stocks divided 
by the average annual amount of fund wealth; Fund age is the number of years that a fund has been founded; 
the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, 
for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The 
numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% 
level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
Dependent'variable'
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7
Fund'age :0.0135*** :0.0133*** :0.0130*** :0.0136*** :0.0136*** :0.0135*** :0.0136***
(0.00279) (0.00283) (0.00278) (0.00282) (0.00277) (0.00281) (0.00276)
Turnover :0.00125** :0.00121** :0.00130** :0.00125** :0.00122** :0.00125** :0.00121**
(0.000499) (0.000492) (0.000523) (0.000498) (0.000482) (0.000497) (0.000478)
Illiquidity'ratio 0.0057 0.00529 0.00567 0.00553 0.00543 0.00565 0.00529
(0.00391) (0.00389) (0.00388) (0.0039) (0.00391) (0.00392) (0.00391)
Fund'size :0.00686** :0.00603* :0.00688** :0.00690** :0.00681** :0.00675** :0.00681**
(0.00301) (0.00311) (0.00297) (0.00304) (0.00302) (0.00299) (0.00302)
GDP'growth 0.0317*** 0.0322*** 0.0317*** 0.0317*** 0.0318*** 0.0318*** 0.0317***
(0.00248) (0.00251) (0.00247) (0.00248) (0.00251) (0.0025) (0.00249)
Unemployment'(%) 0.500*** 0.509*** 0.498*** 0.500*** 0.501*** 0.500*** 0.500***
(0.0384) (0.0391) (0.0386) (0.0386) (0.0385) (0.0386) (0.0381)
Inflation'(%) 0.00905*** 0.00910*** 0.00912*** 0.00904*** 0.00907*** 0.00905*** 0.00908***
(0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00117)
Team :0.00358
(0.00346)
Tenure :0.00243**
(0.00104)
Funds'under'management :0.00349**
(0.00152)
MBA 0.00293
(0.0109)
Ph.D :0.0053
(0.00471)
CFA :0.00401
(0.00748)
Master 0.00771*
(0.00394)
Constant :1.434*** :1.491*** :1.421*** :1.432*** :1.441*** :1.439*** :1.440***
(0.195) (0.2) (0.195) (0.197) (0.196) (0.196) (0.195)
Observations 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604
R:squared 0.591 0.592 0.592 0.591 0.591 0.591 0.591
Efficiency'score
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Table 6: Impact of managerial attributes on Sharp ratio (Fixed effect model) 
 
Notes: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the fund managerial attributes on fund 
performance for the period 2005 to 2013. The dependent variable is Sharp ratio: it is the excess return per unit of 
volatility or total risk. For the independent variables the paper employ team management structure: dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by a team and the value of 0 otherwise; Tenure is the number of years 
that manager has been with a fund; funds under management is the funds under management which presents 
the number of funds under a sole manager or team of managers; MBA degree is a dummy variable which takes 
the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with MBA degree and the value of 0 otherwise; PHD degree 
is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with PHD degree and the value of 0 
otherwise; CFA takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with CFA and the value of 0 otherwise; 
Master degree takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with Master and the value of 0 
otherwise; Illiquidity is used to measure the portfolio’s illiquidity level; Fund size is measured by total net asset 
(TNA) which is equal to total assets minus total liabilities; Turnover is the ratio of the minimum of annual 
purchase or sales stocks divided by the average annual amount of fund wealth; Fund age is the number of years 
that a fund has been founded; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables 
and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2007 and 
the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% 
level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
Dependent'variable'
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7
Fund'age 0.177*** 0.177*** 0.178*** 0.175*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.176***
(0.00776) (0.00796) (0.00795) (0.008) (0.00783) (0.00793) (0.00783)
Turnover B0.00521* B0.00508* B0.00538* B0.00514* B0.00514* B0.00517* B0.00512*
(0.00308) (0.00305) (0.00318) (0.00304) (0.00304) (0.00305) (0.00303)
Illiquidity'ratio 0.0152*** 0.0136** 0.0148*** 0.0141** 0.0141** 0.0138** 0.0138**
(0.0056) (0.00534) (0.00549) (0.00545) (0.00543) (0.00551) (0.00542)
Fund'size 0.0340*** 0.0361*** 0.0339*** 0.0344*** 0.0341*** 0.0337*** 0.0341***
(0.00922) (0.00918) (0.0093) (0.00916) (0.00916) (0.00916) (0.00919)
GDP'growth 0.377*** 0.378*** 0.377*** 0.377*** 0.377*** 0.376*** 0.377***
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Unemployment'(%) B1.035*** B1.010*** B1.043*** B1.027*** B1.032*** B1.032*** B1.034***
(0.139) (0.14) (0.139) (0.14) (0.139) (0.139) (0.139)
Inflation'(%) B0.209*** B0.208*** B0.208*** B0.209*** B0.209*** B0.209*** B0.209***
(0.00337) (0.00339) (0.00339) (0.00339) (0.00337) (0.00338) (0.00337)
Team B0.0200**
(0.00976)
Tenure B0.00619*
(0.00322)
Funds'under'management B0.0136***
(0.00446)
MBA B0.0208
(0.0297)
Ph.D B0.00737
(0.0135)
CFA 0.0117
(0.0174)
Master 0.0119
(0.0124)
Constant 0.456 0.303 0.505 0.413 0.437 0.45 0.439
(0.713) (0.721) (0.713) (0.718) (0.714) (0.717) (0.713)
Observations 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604
RBsquared 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931 0.931
Sharp'ratio
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Table 7: Impact of managerial attributes on Jensen’s Alpha (Fixed effect model) 
 
Notes: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the fund managerial attributes on fund 
performance for the period 2005 to 2013. The dependent variable is Jensen’s Alpha: it obtained from CAPM. For 
the independent variables the paper employ team management structure: dummy which takes the value of 1 if 
the fund is managed by a team and the value of 0 otherwise; Tenure is the number of years that manager has 
been with a fund; funds under management is the funds under management which presents the number of funds 
under a sole manager or team of managers; MBA degree is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
fund is managed by a manager with MBA degree and the value of 0 otherwise; PHD degree is a dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with PHD degree and the value of 0 otherwise; CFA 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with CFA and the value of 0 otherwise; Master degree 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with Master and the value of 0 otherwise; Illiquidity is 
used to measure the portfolio’s illiquidity level; Fund size is measured by total net asset (TNA) which is equal to 
total assets minus total liabilities; Turnover is the ratio of the minimum of annual purchase or sales stocks divided 
by the average annual amount of fund wealth; Fund age is the number of years that a fund has been founded; 
the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, 
for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The 
numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% 
level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
Dependent'variable'
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7
Fund'age 0.0232*** 0.0237*** 0.0256*** 0.0222*** 0.0232*** 0.0236*** 0.0233***
(0.00588) (0.00585) (0.00595) (0.00603) (0.00592) (0.00587) (0.00586)
Turnover B0.00430* B0.00425* B0.00449* B0.00422* B0.00434* B0.00430* B0.00424*
(0.00222) (0.00221) (0.00233) (0.00218) (0.00224) (0.00222) (0.00219)
Illiquidity'ratio 0.01 0.00978 0.0106* 0.0098 0.0102 0.0106* 0.00969
(0.00625) (0.00612) (0.00624) (0.00619) (0.00619) (0.00617) (0.00615)
Fund'size 0.0160* 0.0169* 0.0159* 0.0168* 0.0159* 0.0164* 0.0160*
(0.00893) (0.00913) (0.00905) (0.00897) (0.00892) (0.00883) (0.00895)
GDP'growth 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.132***
(0.0089) (0.00894) (0.00884) (0.00889) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.00888)
Unemployment'(%) 0.349*** 0.359*** 0.340*** 0.361*** 0.348*** 0.348*** 0.348***
(0.101) (0.103) (0.101) (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101)
Inflation'(%) B0.0317*** B0.0317*** B0.0315*** B0.0315*** B0.0318*** B0.0318*** B0.0317***
(0.00281) (0.00281) (0.0028) (0.00282) (0.00281) (0.00281) (0.00281)
Team 0.000386
(0.00794)
Tenure B0.00287
(0.00243)
Funds'under'management B0.0125***
(0.00409)
MBA B0.0472*
(0.0285)
Ph.D 0.00931
(0.0113)
CFA B0.0148
(0.0149)
Master 0.0123
(0.00968)
Constant B2.989*** B3.053*** B2.932*** B3.058*** B2.981*** B2.997*** B2.993***
(0.586) (0.598) (0.585) (0.592) (0.587) (0.582) (0.584)
Observations 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604
RBsquared 0.274 0.275 0.28 0.276 0.275 0.275 0.275
Alpha
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Table 8: Impact of managerial attributes on Efficiency score with different fund size  
 
Notes: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the fund managerial attributes on fund 
performance for the period 2005 to 2013. The dependent variable is Efficiency score: it obtained from SFA. For 
the independent variables the paper employ team management structure: dummy which takes the value of 1 if 
the fund is managed by a team and the value of 0 otherwise; Tenure is the number of years that manager has 
been with a fund; funds under management is the funds under management which presents the number of funds 
under a sole manager or team of managers; MBA degree is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
fund is managed by a manager with MBA degree and the value of 0 otherwise; PHD degree is a dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with PHD degree and the value of 0 otherwise; CFA 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with CFA and the value of 0 otherwise; Master degree 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with Master and the value of 0 otherwise; The numbers 
in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; 
*** significance at the 1% level.  
Dependent'variable'
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7
Control'variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Team <0.0112*
(0.00566)
Tenure <0.00273*
(0.00144)
Funds'under'management <0.00543*
(0.00297)
MBA <0.00448
(0.00928)
Ph.D 0.00279
(0.00767)
CFA 0.00153
(0.00829)
Master 0.00905
(0.00685)
Constant <1.847*** <1.915*** <1.807*** <1.824*** <1.823*** <1.823*** <1.838***
(0.454) (0.475) (0.452) (0.456) (0.458) (0.456) (0.457)
Observations 802 802 802 802 802 802 802
R<squared 0.612 0.611 0.612 0.61 0.61 0.609 0.61
Dependent'variable'
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7
Control'variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Team 0.00321
(0.00427)
Tenure <0.0011
(0.00171)
Funds'under'management <0.000863
(0.00157)
MBA 0.0117
(0.0126)
Ph.D <0.0151**
(0.00588)
CFA <0.00899
(0.0146)
Master 0.00783
(0.00574)
Constant <1.245*** <1.264*** <1.231*** <1.219*** <1.250*** <1.244*** <1.236***
(0.246) (0.256) (0.243) (0.243) (0.242) (0.243) (0.242)
Observations 802 802 802 802 802 802 802
R<squared 0.628 0.627 0.627 0.628 0.631 0.628 0.628
Efficiency'score
Panel'A:'Funds'with'large'size
Efficiency'score
Panel'B:'Funds'with'small'size
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Table 9: Impact of managerial attributes on Efficiency score with different investment objectives 
 
Notes: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the fund managerial attributes on fund 
performance for the period 2005 to 2013. The dependent variable is Efficiency score: it obtained from SFA. For 
the independent variables the paper employ team management structure: dummy which takes the value of 1 if 
the fund is managed by a team and the value of 0 otherwise; Tenure is the number of years that manager has 
been with a fund; funds under management is the funds under management which presents the number of funds 
under a sole manager or team of managers; MBA degree is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
fund is managed by a manager with MBA degree and the value of 0 otherwise; PHD degree is a dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with PHD degree and the value of 0 otherwise; CFA 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with CFA and the value of 0 otherwise; Master degree 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with Master and the value of 0 otherwise; The numbers 
in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; 
*** significance at the 1% level.  
Dependent'variable'
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7
Control'variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Team <0.00343
(0.00483)
Tenure <0.0021
(0.00151)
Funds'under'management <0.00411*
(0.00244)
MBA <0.00596
(0.00802)
Ph.D <0.0116*
(0.00624)
CFA <0.00864
(0.0119)
Master 0.0140***
(0.00518)
Constant <1.735*** <1.780*** <1.717*** <1.744*** <1.730*** <1.739*** <1.692***
(0.294) (0.298) (0.293) (0.295) (0.291) (0.293) (0.289)
Observations 790 790 790 790 790 790 790
R<squared 0.635 0.636 0.636 0.635 0.637 0.636 0.638
Dependent'variable'
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7
Control'variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Team <0.00539
(0.00501)
Tenure <0.00251*
(0.00144)
Funds'under'management <0.00263
(0.00179)
MBA 0.0196
(0.0278)
Ph.D 0.000766
(0.00626)
CFA <0.00561
(0.00895)
Master <0.000259
(0.00518)
Constant <1.104*** <1.168*** <1.110*** <1.089*** <1.116*** <1.121*** <1.117***
(0.255) (0.263) (0.254) (0.259) (0.259) (0.255) (0.262)
Observations 814 814 814 814 814 814 814
R<squared 0.539 0.54 0.539 0.539 0.538 0.538 0.538
Efficiency'score
Panel'A:'Funds'with'growth'investment'objective
Efficiency'score
Panel'B:'Funds'with'value'investment'objective
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Table 10: Impact of managerial attributes on Fund efficiency score (Dynamic panel 
model) 
 
Notes: The table reports results of the dynamic panel models investigating the impact of team management 
structure on equity fund performance for the period 2005 to 2013. The dependent variable is Efficiency score: it 
obtained from SFA;. For the independent variables the paper employ team management structure: dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by a team and the value of 0 otherwise; L.Dep is the one year lagged 
estimate of the performance variable and is used to measure fund performance persistence under each model; 
Tenure is the number of years that manager has been with a fund; funds under management is the funds under 
management which presents the number of funds under a sole manager or team of managers; MBA degree is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by a manager with MBA degree and the value 
of 0 otherwise; PHD degree is a dummy which takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with 
PHD degree and the value of 0 otherwise; CFA takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with 
CFA and the value of 0 otherwise; Master degree takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with 
Master and the value of 0 otherwise; Illiquidity is used to measure the portfolio’s illiquidity level; Fund size is 
measured by total net asset (TNA) which is equal to total assets minus total liabilities; Turnover is the ratio of the 
minimum of annual purchase or sales stocks divided by the average annual amount of fund wealth; Fund age is 
Dependent'variable'
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7
L.wefficiency =0.147*** =0.143*** =0.147*** =0.142*** =0.142*** =0.141*** =0.144***
(0.0324) (0.0326) (0.0311) (0.0324) (0.0321) (0.0334) (0.0321)
Fund'age 0.00242** 0.00231** 0.00290*** 0.00222** 0.00214** 0.00184* 0.00212*
(0.00109) (0.0011) (0.00111) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00109) (0.00108)
Turnover =0.000670* =0.000529 =0.000593 =0.000602 =0.000566 =0.000686 =0.00057
(0.000393) (0.000372) (0.000472) (0.000404) (0.00038) (0.000438) (0.000391)
Illiquidity'ratio 0.00439 0.00256 0.00364 0.00306 0.00312 0.00453 0.00289
(0.00632) (0.0065) (0.00617) (0.00644) (0.00633) (0.00649) (0.00636)
Fund'size =0.00118 =0.000108 =0.00287 =0.00148 =0.00175 =0.00115 =0.00142
(0.00213) (0.00232) (0.00217) (0.0022) (0.00215) (0.00221) (0.00216)
GDP'growth 0.0277*** 0.0282*** 0.0284*** 0.0275*** 0.0276*** 0.0279*** 0.0273***
(0.00252) (0.00252) (0.00267) (0.00253) (0.00258) (0.00251) (0.00251)
Unemployment'(%) 0.229*** 0.243*** 0.251*** 0.227*** 0.228*** 0.238*** 0.225***
(0.0249) (0.0273) (0.0292) (0.0254) (0.0258) (0.0262) (0.025)
Inflation'(%) 0.000504 0.00069 0.00142 0.000627 0.000639 0.000877 0.000574
(0.000844) (0.000854) (0.000954) (0.000849) (0.000844) (0.000902) (0.000846)
Team =0.0130***
(0.0045)
Tenure =0.00462*
(0.00267)
Funds'under'management =0.0156***
(0.00414)
MBA 0.0142
(0.0249)
Ph.D =0.00398
(0.0118)
CFA =0.0211
(0.0143)
Master =0.00216
(0.00868)
Constant =0.242 =0.323* =0.288 =0.233 =0.233 =0.288* =0.22
(0.162) (0.178) (0.177) (0.166) (0.165) (0.168) (0.163)
Observations 1279 1279 1279 1279 1279 1279 1279
AR'(2)'P'='value 0.344 0.417 0.512 0.433 0.418 0.387 0.429
Hansen'J'test'p'='value 0.945 0.927 0.944 0.935 0.924 0.934 0.929
Efficiency'score'
50	  
	  
the number of years that a fund has been founded; the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  
year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if 
the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, 
*significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
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Table 11: Impact of managerial attributes on Fund efficiency score (Robustness 
check) 
 
Notes: The table reports results of the fixed effect models investigating the fund managerial attributes on fund 
performance for the period 2005 to 2013. The dependent variable is Efficiency score: it obtained from SFA. For 
the independent variables the paper employ team management structure: dummy which takes the value of 1 if 
the fund is managed by a team and the value of 0 otherwise; Tenure is the number of years that manager has 
been with a fund; funds under management is the funds under management which presents the number of funds 
under a sole manager or team of managers; MBA degree is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the 
fund is managed by a manager with MBA degree and the value of 0 otherwise; PHD degree is a dummy which 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with PHD degree and the value of 0 otherwise; CFA 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with CFA and the value of 0 otherwise; Master degree 
takes the value of 1 if the fund is managed by  a manager with Master and the value of 0 otherwise; Illiquidity is 
used to measure the portfolio’s illiquidity level; Fund size is measured by total net asset (TNA) which is equal to 
total assets minus total liabilities; Turnover is the ratio of the minimum of annual purchase or sales stocks divided 
by the average annual amount of fund wealth; Fund age is the number of years that a fund has been founded; 
the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 is a series of  year dummy variables and is not reported in this table, 
for instance, the year of 2007 which takes the value of 1 if the year is 2007 and the value of 0 otherwise. The 
Dependent'variable'
Model Model'1 Model'2 Model'3 Model'4 Model'5 Model'6 Model'7
Fund'age :0.00755*** :0.00721*** :0.00722*** :0.00743*** :0.00748*** :0.00744*** :0.00748***
(0.00175) (0.00177) (0.00174) (0.00177) (0.00173) (0.00176) (0.00173)
Turnover :0.000858** :0.000830** :0.000884** :0.000867** :0.000840** :0.000862** :0.000838**
(0.000387) (0.000385) (0.0004) (0.000391) (0.000376) (0.000389) (0.000377)
Illiquidity'ratio 0.00285 0.00273 0.00299 0.00294 0.00285 0.00302 0.00278
(0.00222) (0.00218) (0.00218) (0.00221) (0.0022) (0.00224) (0.0022)
Fund'size :0.00628*** :0.00559*** :0.00629*** :0.00634*** :0.00624*** :0.00621*** :0.00625***
(0.00177) (0.0018) (0.00175) (0.00178) (0.00177) (0.00174) (0.00177)
GDP'growth 0.0183*** 0.0188*** 0.0183*** 0.0183*** 0.0185*** 0.0184*** 0.0183***
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.00159) (0.00159) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.00159)
Unemployment'(%) 0.281*** 0.288*** 0.280*** 0.280*** 0.281*** 0.281*** 0.280***
(0.0232) (0.0235) (0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0232) (0.0229)
Inflation'(%) 0.00500*** 0.00504*** 0.00502*** 0.00498*** 0.00501*** 0.00500*** 0.00502***
(0.000672) (0.000677) (0.000671) (0.000672) (0.00067) (0.000671) (0.000668)
Team 0.00141
(0.00217)
Tenure :0.00204***
(0.000642)
Funds'under'management :0.00150*
(0.000892)
MBA 0.00321
(0.00739)
Ph.D :0.00457
(0.003)
CFA :0.00294
(0.00483)
Master 0.00484**
(0.00222)
Constant :0.356*** :0.401*** :0.348*** :0.350*** :0.359*** :0.357*** :0.357***
(0.119) (0.121) (0.118) (0.119) (0.119) (0.118) (0.118)
Observations 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604 1604
R:squared 0.559 0.562 0.56 0.559 0.56 0.559 0.56
Efficiency'score
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numbers in the parentheses are corrected standard errors, *significance at the 10% level; ** significance at the 5% 
level; *** significance at the 1% level.  
 
 
Fig. 1. The average performance of the Chinese mutual fund industry 
 
 
This Figure plots the average efficiency score of Chinese equity mutual funds by using SFA. The 
sample period is from 2005 to 2013. 
 
Fig. 2. The average performance of the Chinese mutual fund industry 
 
 
This Figure plots the average Sharp ratio of Chinese equity mutual funds. The sample period is from 
2005 to 2013. 
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Fig. 3. The average performance of the Chinese mutual fund industry 
 
 
This Figure plots the average Jensen’s alpha of Chinese equity mutual funds by using CAPM model. 
The sample period is from 2005 to 2013. 
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